Abstrucf-As ad hoc network has advanced, the importance of security increases more and more. But it suffers from the restriction that ad hoc network does not have the established infrastructure. In this paper we propose a security-enhanced model with ID-Based cryptosystem which removes the necessity for any infrastructure and provides sound authentication and a more secure and concrete routing pmtocoi with aggregate signature. ID-Based aggregate signature scheme, which is also proposed in this paper, removes the necessity for ccrti6crte transmission and verification. And it reduces communication cost significantly because our aggregate scheme compresses many signatures into only one signature keeping the same security Ievel as existing signature schemes.
In the public key scheme [12], 1141, each node has a pair of public key and private key. As opposed to the characteristics o f ad hoc netwofk, it needs the established infrastructure to distribute, manage, and revoke public keys.
The objective of this paper is to propose a comprehensive solution based on ID-based cryptosystem. The main advantages are described as follows:
ID-based cryptosystem in ad hoc network solves the problem of iraditional public key cryptosystem by elimi-, nating the necessity for the infrastructure to authenticate public keys and manage certificates and directories to store certificates. We provide an efficient routing protocol with more concrete security by using ID-based aggregate signature. IDbased signature scheme eliminates the necessity to verify certificates and transfer them. And ID-based aggregate signature, which is the compression of many signatures into only one signature, reduces the communication cost to constant in routing protocol.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section II,
we describe ID-based cryptosystem and propose an ID-based aggregate signature scheme. Then we present the securityenhanced model in section 111. In section IV and V, we analyze our model in both security and performance aspects. Finally w e conclude the paper in section VI.
rI. ID-BASED CRYPTOSYSTEM
In this section, we explain the concept of ID-based cryptosystem and propose an ID-3ased aggregate signature firstly.
A. The Concept of ID-Based Cvptosysiem
The main problem of traditional public key cryptosystem is the assumption of the infrastructure to authenticate public keys and manage certificates. To simplify them, the concept of ID-based cryptosystem was proposed by Shamir [13] . In this system, an entity's public and unique identification information such as email address or device's serial number plays the role of its public key. So the users need not to exchange their public keys and associated certificates. Another advantage is that it eliminates the need for directories to store certificates.
Recent ID-based cryptosystems make use of the bilinear map proposed by Boneh and Franklin [l] . And . .
There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for a y P,Q E GI.
Non-degenerate
Computable
The Bilinear Difie-Hellman Problem (BDHP) in < GI,Gz,e >, which is the basis of security in these systems, can be stated as follows:
given P,aP, bP,cP E ' G~ for any a,b,c E E,, compute ~( P , P )~~~. ( 4) and sends it. The public key of him is set to
E. ID-Based Aggregate Signature

Sign
Given a private key DID and a message M E (0, I}", the signer chooses a random number T E E,, computes
Verify
Given an identity ID, a message M and a sjgnature U = (U, V ) , the verifier computes
and checks whether
If it is true, then the signature is valid. Otherwise, it is not valid and rejected.
Aggregate
Given an aggregate signature 0 = (U,V) on distinct messages M I , ,._, Mi-* and a signature r ' = (U', V') on a message Mi, the aggregator verify that Mi is different from any other messages. Tf it is true, he computes 
If it is true, all the signatures in U are valid. Otherwise, at least one of the signatures is invalid.
SECURITY ENHANCED MODEL
In this section, we propose a security enhanced model to provide a comprehensive answer to the security problems in ad hoc network. We firstly adopt ID-based cryptosystem to solve the problem of traditional public key cryptosystem. Secondly, we present a secure routing solution based on ID-based aggregate signature which is proposed in section 11. Using ID-based aggregate signature, our solution reduces the size of not only signature lists but also certificate chain and avoids the inappropriate assumptions for the nature of ad hoc network.
A. Initialization Phase
Initialization phase is performed only once prior to the formation of the ad hoc network. In this phase, off-line server sets up system parameters and distributes each node's private key securely.
. .
Setup System Parameters
I ) Off-line server chooses a generator P of G1, picks a master secret key s G ZP and set ppub = SP. The key s is only known to off-line server and the others are publicly known.
2) It also select two cryptographic hash functions H1 :
(0,l)' + Z, and H2 : (0, I}' + 6 1 . Private Key Generation 1) Each initial node w i h the identity ID must have a pair of public and private keys. Each node gets its own public key by computing Q J D = H2(lD).
2) For each node, the server computes its private key D I D = S Q ,~ with the master secret key s. Because s is kept secret by the server, anyone else cannot compute the private key.
E. Route Discovmy Phase
' In this phase, we present a secure routing protocol based on ,on-demand routing protocols such as DSR 171 or AODV [I I] where a node attempts to discover a route to some destination only when it has a packet to send to the destination. To secure a routing protocol in ad hoc network, the authentication of nodes in the network and the integrity verification of messages between nodes are required. We solve the requirements by using ID-based signature and IJI-based aggregate signature. 
A . Aurhenrication
Authentication is a basic building block of security, But the traditional mechanisms including Public Key Infrastructure(PK1) require pre-estabiished infrastructure to manage certificates. It must be assumed that there exists a trusted authority through the whole lifetime of the network to issue new certificates, revoke compromised certificates, and renew expired certificates. However this assumption is not suitable due to the nature of ad hoc network.
On the other hand, our model is based on ID-based cryptosystem. Its main advantage is that it eliminates the necessity to manage certificates because the unique identity of a node is used as the public key of itself. Still the problem of revocation remains. But in many cases the compromised node has a critical vulnerability so,it is recommended not to use it anymore.
B. Secure Routing
Secure routing is a special requirement in ad hoc network because routing functions are carried out by all available nodes. Current secure routing protocols take into account active attacks performed to disrupt the correct route hnctioning by modifying route information, fabricating false route information, and impersonating other nodes.
The weak point of ARAN is that there is no way to prevent a malicious intermediate node from modifying route path because only one-hop neighbor node is authenticated, and there is no mechanism to check the integrity of the route. An intuitive solution is that the intermediate node adds its ID in B + A : [RERR,IDA, I D o , seqJSigna The RERR is a packet type identifier, the IDA is the identity of the source node A, and the I D D is the identity of the destination node D. The seq ensures the E R R message is fresh and the Signs, node B's signature, guarantees not only the integrity of the RERR message but also the non-repudiation of node B.
IV. SECUR~TY ANALYS~S
In ad hoc network, several properties for security are required. Among them, authentication, integrity, and secure routing are more important because they are the bases of other properties.
Authenticdim : A node wants to be sure that it is'talking . Secure Rouling : A node wants to find a correct and Integriry : A node wants to be sure that the message
In this section, we analyze and discuss our model in the aspect of each category.
to whomever it intends. reliable route path.
cannot be altered in an unauthorized way.
the path list and also adds its signature on the modified path list without removing other signatures. But this solution increases the number of signatures and certificates added to the original message proportionaliy to hop count, and thus requires a heavy communication cost.
Our model solves this problem with aggregate signature. Because aggregate signature merges all signatures through the path into a single one and no certificates are added, our model efficiently defends against not only incorrect modification of path but also impersonating. And the node fabricating false route information can be excluded later because ID-based signature provides non-repudiation. In the aspect of computation cost, our model has a similar cost to ARAN. Because if the length of route path is n, the cost of verifying an aggregate signature is similar to the cost of verifying n signatures.
C. Inregriiy
Integrity can be guaranteed by adding D-based signature to the message. Because only the node that holds the identity and associated private key can generate a valid signature, any other node can not alter the message.
v. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare our model with previous models. We only consider the communication cost of RREQ message when the length of route path is R , because this type of message has a remarkable contrast. In the previous models, suppose that 1024 bits RSA key is used, the size of certificate is 900 bytes, and the size of signature is 150 bytes. Then the total number of bytes to be transferred additionally is n c(900 + 150)i = 525n(n f 1).
On the other hands, suppose that our model uses 160 bits key in the eIliptic curve system having similar security level to '1024 bits RSA key, and the size of signature is 62 bytes. Then the total number of bytes to be transferred additionally is only 62n because certificates are not used and aggregate signature is used. Therefore our model reduces communication cost significantly.
fin the aspect of computation cost, our model perfoms one verification of aggregate signature which is the same as verification of n signatures. But there is no need to verify'any certificate. Therefore, our model is more efficient than others.
VI. CONCLUSION
Currently the major issues in ad hoc network are secure routing, authentication, and key management. Among them, key management itself depends very closely on authentication and sound key management is not possible without sound authentication.
In this paper, we proposed a security-enhanced model with ID-based cryptosystem. Our model provides a sound authentication mechanism without certificate management problem.
Also we proposed a secure routing protocol with aggregate signature, which reduces communication cost significantly. We expect that our model contributes to designing a securityenhanced environment appropriate to ad hoc network.
